Rickerism

Background

Objective

The Global War on Terror places new and significantly different requirements on armored vehicles than those needed for a war against the Soviet Union. There have also been significant technological advances in material technology since the end of the Cold War.

All the vehicles currently in the US Army were designed for the Cold War. To our knowledge, there is no vehicle currently in production that was specifically designed for the Global War on Terror.

Our objective is to incorporate the new requirements, new materials and new approaches into a new armored vehicle that is specifically designed to meet the requirements of the Global War on Terror.

The concept of the front

US Army doctrine during the Cold War maintained the concept of a front. There was a line at which friendly forces engaged enemy forces with lethal force. Combat units were designed with training and equipment to be at the front and handle violent engagement. Combat support units were designed with protection enough to endure temporary exposure to enemy fire. Combat service support units were far behind the line and had no protection against enemy fire.

The concept the front is a design assumption ingrained into the entire US Army force structure, especially the vehicles. M1 Abrams tanks have ample armor because they were designed to be at the front. M109 howitzers have armor because they were designed to be near the front. HMMWV have no armor because they were designed to be behind the front in combat service support roles.

In the Global War on Terror, there is no front. Combat, combat support and combat service support units are all equal exposed to violent engagement by the enemy.

Ubiquitous armor

It is long understood in the Cold War that units exposed to enemy fire require protection to be effective. With no front, all units are exposed to enemy fire, so all units require protection.

The protection is not the same as it was in the Cold War. In the Cold War, our units faced the Soviet Army and its heavy tanks and artillery. In the Global War on Terror, our units face 7.62 armor piercing (AP) rounds and innovated explosive devices (IED).

IED is the weapon of choice among insurgent forces. They are cheap, standoff, simple and effective. The nature of the blast and subsequent fragmentation cause initial destruction with concussive, heat and shrapnel injuries. There is also the factor of roll over and slam down that adds further injury.

Strain of armor

As the Global War on Terror has escalated, it has become necessary to address the armoring needs of thousands of vehicles in theatre that are either too lightly armored to adequately protect from new threats or were never intended to be armored as their service role had not, until now, required it.

Many of these vehicles were not designed to carry the stresses that conventional armoring presents. Excessive additional weight overloads the suspension and braking systems. Handling at even moderate speeds becomes difficult and dangerous. Engines, once adequate to handle the mission requirements, are now undersized for carrying both the additional weight of armor and the vehicles mission payload.

Additionally, most current armor solutions were created to stop small to large arms fire. Little protection is typically provided for the two most critical areas of personnel injury, improvised explosive device (IED) blast from side or below and fragmentation.

Rapidly changing threat

In the Cold War, the threat was Soviet designed forces. As such, even though the Department of Defense weapon programs were horrifically slow, they were still much faster than the Communist programs that they countered.

The threat no longer moves in terms of decades as it did in the Cold War. Now the threat moves in terms of months. The IED was unknown before the invasion of Iraq. The IED in Iraq today is very different than the IED two years ago. As such, the armored vehicles must be as adaptable to change as the enemy they face. Either we must be able to rapidly replace the entire vehicle or replace the key threatened components.

Trans-organization forces

The US Army is not the only organization on the battlefield.

In the Second World War, there were huge areas that only the US Army was present. It worked almost entirely alone. During the Cold War, the US Army became accustomed to working side by side with other NATO armies. By the time of Operation Desert Storm, the US Army was accustomed to Joint operations with US Air Force and Navy units present.

In the Global War on Terror, the US Army is but a fraction of the actual forces moving in the theater. There are now many non-government organizations (NGO) and a great many contractors such as Blackwater and Halliburton with thousands of individuals in combat, combat support and combat service support roles.

Without a front, these non-government and commercial organizations require armored vehicles too.

Requirements

R01. 250k price

The retail price of the DREADNOUGHT must be $250,000. This price point comes from the experience of Blackwater USA. It makes sense, though, when one considers just how many of these vehicles are needed and that it is organizations with budget constraints that need them.

That price is what a commercial customer would pay to roll a vehicle off the lot. That means the cost of manufacturing the vehicle must be less than $250,000. Although many companies claim to offer a vehicle for this price, the actual price is more than $500,000.

R02. Commercial chassis

Build the DREADNOUGHT on a commercial medium duty (Class V) truck chassis. This requirement is driven by the cost requirement, but it is also driven by the non-military use case as well. It is impractical for any organization other than the US Army to buy 400 vehicles that do not have large commercial support. One could also argue that it is not practical for the US Army, either.

Which commercial chassis is a question. Marne has a existing relationship with International Truck. The US State Department is standardized on General Motors. Dodge has just returned to the medium duty truck market and will be eager for success stories. We will assume the GM 5500 Kodiak, a.k.a. GMC 5500 Top Kick.

R03. Carry 10 people

The ten includes the driver.

R04. A-kit/b-kit armor design

Use a-kit/b-kit design. The us army’s long term armor strategy is described as “a-kit/b-kit” design. The a-kit is an unarmored vehicle frame that is capable of sustaining the weight and strain of armor. The b-kit is the armor itself that attaches to the vehicle frame. The elastomeric polymer armor will attach in panels to the vehicle as the b-kit. This approach will also enable replacing panels that have been hit without having to decommission the entire vehicle.

The B-kit armor should stop a 7.62 AP round.

Panels should weigh less than 18 kg (40 lbs) and require no tools to replace.

R05. Polymer armor

We conducted experiments with elastomeric polymer composite armor in 2005 at the US Army Tank-Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC). One experimental panel stopped 20mm rounds. Besides being lightweight, polymer armor is easily molded for body panels for mass manufacturing. The cutting an welding of armored steel has the expense of intense skilled manual labor.

R06. slope all sides

Slope the sides. All vehicle sides should be exceedingly sloped, as close to 45 degrees as possible. The most common threats are Russian rifle propelled grenades (RPG) which only has a 10 percent chance of exploding if it hits a sloped surface.

R07. plenty of visibility

Provide plenty of visibility. Experience by Blackwater, the Israelis and the South Africans all confirm that in urban insurgency environments, the occupants need to be able to see well out of the vehicle in order to maintain awareness of their situation.

R08. Occupants can fight

Enable occupants to fight. Occupants need to be able to return high volume of fire should the vehicle become disabled. The armor of the vehicle is an obstacle, and army tactics have long established that an obstacle without covering fire is useless.

R09. Blast seats

Use blast restraint seats. A mine explosion is a two-phase event: first the blast up and then the smash down. The armor of the vehicle protects the occupants from the blast, but without blast restraint seats, the occupants will be severely injured from the smash down.

R10. Move quickly

The vehicle must be able to move quickly, 100 km/hr (60 mph), over a typical highway in a Third World country. The vehicle must have a tight turn radius and great acceleration in order to be able to get out of a tight situation in a city.

The off-road requirements are like those of a sport utility vehicle, not a tank.

Design

Our experiments showed that polymer armor could stop 7.62 (39) at 11 lbs/sqft and 7.62 (63) AP at 15 lbs/sqft. Compare to 0.5″ steel at 20 lbs/sqft.

The following sketches show the design of the crew compartment on a commercial medium straight-rail chassis. Not shown is the cab redesign that provides sloping to the driver and engine.